**Publications:**

1. "

**The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable Matchings with One-sided Preferences**," with

*Jiangtao Li*and

*Rui Tang*,

**G**

*, 124 (2020), 305-318.*

**ames and Economic Behavior**2. "

**Learning by Matching**," with

*Yi-Chun Chen*,

**, 15 (2020), 29-56**

*Theoretical Economics**.*

**Working Papers:**

3. "

**A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information**," with

*Yi-Chun Chen*, 2020.

*R&R at***American Economic Journal: Microeconomics****Abstract:**We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents' information structure, requires (i) individual rationality, (ii) no blocking and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect, in the presence of general two-sided incomplete information. We show that a stable state exists; moreover, if a state is stable, then coarsening agents' information leads to another stable state.

**A Theory of Revealed Indirect Preference**," with

*Jiangtao Li*,

*John Quah*and

*Rui Tang*, 2020.

**Abstract:**A preference over menus is said to be an indirect preference if it is induced by a preference over the objects that make up those menus, i.e., a menu A is ranked over B whenever A contains an object that is preferred to every object in B. The basic question we address in this paper is the following: suppose an observer has partial information of an agent's ranking over certain menus; what necessary and sufficient conditions on those rankings guarantee the existence of a preference over objects that induces the observed menu rankings? Our basic result has a wide variety of applications.- It gives a characterization of rankings over prices that could be extended to a bona fide indirect utility function.
- It leads to a generalization of Afriat's (1967) Theorem that allows for imperfectly observed choices.
- It could be used to characterize observations that are consistent with a multiple preferences model.
- It leads to a characterization of a model of choice generated by minimax regret.

**Optimal Multi-unit Allocation with Costly Verification**," with

*Geoffrey Chua*and

*Fang Liu*, 2019.

**[Earlier Version**

**]**

**Abstract:**A principal has n homogeneous objects to allocate to I > n agents. The principal can allocate at most one good to an agent and each agent values the good. Agents have private information about the principal’s payoff of allocating the goods. There are no monetary transfers but the principal can costly check any agent’s value. We characterize the mechanism which maximizes the principal’s net expected payoff. Such an optimal mechanism is easily implementable by a dynamic game which has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies. We also compare the optimal mechanism with an alternative mechanism that allocates the goods one by one, where the single-good optimal mechanism is used in each step. The optimal mechanism dominates such an alternative in a particular way: Under any value profile, the two mechanisms allocate the goods to the same set of agents, but the optimal mechanism checks agents less frequently.

**A Note on Bayesian Stability and Bayesian Efficiency**," with

*Yi-Chun Chen*, 2020.

**Abstract:**In this paper, we extend the stability notion and Bayesian efficiency notion of Liu (2020) to local ones, as well as his result—that under certain intuitive conditions, stable matchings are Bayesian efficient—to an analogous one for local notions.The extended stability notion, and thus Liu’s notion, admits a decentralized foundation via an adaptive matching process.

**Resource-consuming Deferred Acceptance**," with

*Ning Sun*,

*Jingsheng Yu*and

*Ning Yu*, 2017.

**Work in Progress:**

8. "Deferred Acceptance with Incomplete Information," joint with

*Yi-Chun Chen.*